Although households have invested billions in 401(k) accounts, these balances may not be new saving if workers invest money that they would have saved in the program's absence. In this paper, I assess the effect of the 401(k) program on saving by comparing changes in the wealth of 401(k) eligible and ineligible households over the 1989-1998 period using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). This comparison may yield misleading estimates of the effect of 401(k)s on saving if eligible households have a higher taste for saving than ineligible households or if they begin the 1989-1998 period with greater amounts of wealth. I adjust for these potential biases by constructing subjective measures of saving taste from questions on the SCF and by transforming the wealth measure with the inverse hyperbolic sine. Incorporating these adjustments suggests that 401(k)s have little to no effect on saving.
INTRODUCTION
The 401(k) program was introduced in 1978 to encourage personal saving for retirement and to help raise the U.S. savings rate.
1 Originally the program was viewed as a supplement to employer-provided pension plans. However, over time these plans have become the primary employer-sponsored retirement vehicle for many Americans. By 1996, household balances in 401(k) accounts exceeded one trillion dollars.
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The 401(k) program features strong inducements for saving, including tax-deferred contributions and earnings, convenience and, frequently, employer matching of contributions.
Under the program, workers can choose to deposit a percentage of their before-tax pay each month in investments such as mutual funds, guaranteed investment contracts or their employer's stock.
These contributions are deducted automatically from the worker's paycheck. Earnings and contributions are taxed only when assets are withdrawn at retirement. In the interim, earnings compound at the pre-tax rate. Furthermore, most employers match all or part of employee contributions, yielding an even higher rate of return.
Not all workers are eligible, however. Workers are only eligible for the 401(k) program if their employer decides to offer a plan. In fact, employers determine almost all details of the program structure, including which investments are available, what matching rate will be provided, and whether workers can borrow against their 401(k) balances.
Although households have invested large sums of money in their 401(k) accounts, these balances may not represent new saving. Households may simply have transferred existing assets 1 Its use did not become widespread until the IRS issued clarifying regulations in 1981. 401(k) plans are available only to workers in for-profit firms. Workers in non-profits are eligible for 403(b)s, and state and local government employees participate in 457 plans. Government plans are often called "thrift" plans. All these programs have similar provisions and features. The empirical analysis in this paper classifies 401(k), 403(b) , and thrift plans as 401(k)s.
to these accounts or invested money in 401(k)s that they would have saved even without the program. If so, the government is subsidizing saving that would have occurred in the absence of the 401(k) program.
To examine whether the 401(k) program increases private saving, I compare the changes in wealth over time of 401(k) eligible and ineligible workers. 3 If 401(k)s raise saving, I expect that the wealth of eligible households will grow faster over time than the wealth of ineligible households. The identifying assumption of this test is that in the absence of the 401(k) program, eligible and ineligible households would have equivalent wealth accumulation patterns after controlling for observable characteristics that affect saving, such as age, education and marital status. Variants of this test were originally laid out in the work of Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995 , 1996a , 1996b , Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994, 1996) and Engen and Gale (1997, 2000) . 4 I carry out these comparisons using data from the 1989, 1992, 1995 and 1998 Surveys of Consumer Finances. The SCF is substantially more recent than the data used in other 401(k) research and is generally considered the highest quality wealth data available. 5 It also has several unique features that allow me to address some limitations of the existing 401(k) literature.
First, I use an extensive battery of subjective questions plausibly related to household saving habits and preferences to control for differences in saving taste between eligible and ineligible households. Households with a high taste for saving may gravitate towards the 401(k)
program, either by seeking out employers that offer the program or by pressuring their current employer to offer a plan. An unobserved eligible-ineligible difference in saving taste can falsely suggest that the 401(k) program raises saving. Previous 401(k) research has discussed this selection issue in depth, but has lacked a direct method to assess its importance. In this paper, I
document that adjusting for differences in saving taste decreases the estimated effect of 401(k)s on saving.
Second, I construct comprehensive measures of wealth from the detailed data available on the SCF. Engen and Gale (1997) emphasize that households can substitute between 401(k)s and any asset or liability. However, the wealth measures used in previous papers do not capture several possible margins of substitution, including many real asset categories. I find that eligible households generally hold more mortgage debt than ineligible households, suggesting that workers may fund their 401(k) accounts by reducing their home equity.
Another possible margin of substitution is firm-level substitution of 401(k) plans for other retirement plans. From 1984 to 1996, the percentage of the workforce covered by a defined benefit pension fell by twelve percentage points, while the percentage participating in a 401(k)
increased by twenty-one percentage points. 6 If workers are receiving 401(k) benefits in lieu of retirement benefits that they would have otherwise received, the 401(k) program is not increasing wealth. 7 However, I find little evidence that firm-level pension substitution is biasing the results.
In fact, eligible households have more wealth in non-401(k) pension plans than ineligible households. Furthermore, adding these non-401(k) pension benefits to the wealth measure has little to no effect on the change in eligible wealth, relative to ineligible wealth, over time.
Finally, I address two technical issues that may overstate the estimated effect of 401(k)s on saving. As is standard in the literature, I compare the wealth of eligible and ineligible households 6 Tabulation based on U.S. Department of Labor (2000), Tables E4 and E23. 7 Engelhardt (2000) provides one of the first direct examinations of this hypothesis.
using median regression. I show that adjusting the median regression standard errors for heteroskedasticity and for the inherent measurement uncertainty in wealth data substantially increases the standard errors, casting doubt on previous results reported as being statistically significant.
In addition, I use an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to measure change in wealth over time in percentages rather than levels. If eligible households start out with more wealth than ineligible households, yet increase their saving at the same rate, a "levels" specification will indicate that the 401(k) program has increased saving, while a percentage change specification will not. I estimate the parameters of the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation using maximum likelihood, thus exploiting the equivalence of median regression and maximum likelihood when the error term has a LaPlace distribution. This methodology extends the work of Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1988) to the case of median regression. I demonstrate that incorporating this modification decreases the estimated effect of 401(k)s on saving.
After implementing these adjustments, I find no evidence that the 401(k) program increased saving over the 1989-1998 period. Although real median 401(k) balances grew from $4,000 in 1989 to $11,000 in 1998, the wealth of eligible households did not grow relative to the wealth of ineligible households, either in the aggregate or within income categories, even when non-401(k) retirement assets are added to the wealth measure. These results suggest that the 401(k) program is providing a tax subsidy to eligible households but not an effective inducement to increase overall saving. Third, the SCF asks: over the next five years, do you expect the U.S. economy as a whole to perform better or worse than it has over the past five years? I set a dummy variable equal to one for households who expect the economy to worsen. A fourth set of questions ask how important it is to the household to leave a bequest. I create dummy variables for "very important"
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and "somewhat important." I also create a dummy variable for households who expect to receive a bequest. Fifth, the survey asks households about the degree of risk that they are willing to take with their investments. Following the coding in the SCF codebook, I create dummy variables for "take very high investment risks," "take above average risks," "take average risks" and "take no risks." Table 1 displays the means of these variables by eligibility status, weighted by the SCF sampling weights. Eligibles and ineligibles clearly differ across some dimensions of saving taste.
Eligibles are more likely to name retirement as their primary reason for saving. They are more likely to anticipate significant expenses in the next five to ten years, especially expenditures for children's education. Ineligible households, in contrast, are more likely to anticipate future health expenditures. In addition, eligible households place a higher value on farther-off time periods than do ineligibles. They tolerate more risk in their investments and are more likely to expect a bequest. These differences are statistically significant in most of the four years.
As noted earlier, eligible households are wealthier and more educated than their ineligible counterparts. The saving taste differences may reflect only these underlying demographic 11 See, for example, discussions in Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995 , 1996a , 1996b , Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994, 1995) and Engen and Gale (1997, 2000) .
differences. To check this possibility, I calculated the sample means conditional on three separate distributions: age, education, and income. Even within each of these subgroups, eligible households appear to have higher tastes for saving, as indicated by these subjective responses, than ineligible households, suggesting that demographic differences alone may not explain the correlation between eligibility and saving taste. Table 2 displays these eligible -ineligible differences for 1995 conditional on income. Within the income subgroups, as within the age and education subgroups, the majority of these differences are statistically significant.
These variables, however, may reflect an effect of the 401(k) program as well as exogenous differences in saving taste. For example, under federal regulations, firms that offer the 401(k) program must document that both low-income and high-income workers are benefiting from the program. Firms may attempt to increase the participation of low-income workers by offering educational materials and seminars that tout the advantages of saving for retirement. In addition, workers may interpret their employer's provision of a retirement plan as a signal that saving for retirement is important, and increase their saving accordingly. If these aspects of the program affect a worker's saving habits and preferences, the saving taste variables may capture an effect of the 401(k) program as well as exogenous differences between eligible and ineligible households.
In the empirical analysis, I test the sensitivity of the results to excluding saving measures most likely to be influenced by 401(k) eligibility.
SPECIFICATION
I compare the wealth of eligible and ineligible households using median regression, which minimizes the sum of absolute deviations and yields conditional medians as predicted values. Since it is not affected by outlier data points, it is a useful tool for wealth data, which often take on extreme values. 12 The primary specification is: 14 1996a, 1996b), Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994, 1995) , Engen and Gale (1997, 2000) and Engelhardt (2000) . 13 See Appendix A for the SCF 401(k) question structure. 14 Balances are measured over 401(k) eligible, rather than 401(k) participating, households for comparison purposes with the median regression specification.
In addition, despite the influx of 401(k) eligible households, the characteristics of eligible and ineligible households have remained constant. Although these groups differ in their demographic characteristics and their tastes for saving, these characteristics do not change within either group over time. These findings are consistent with Engen and Gale (2000), who conclude that there is little evidence that the characteristics of eligible and ineligible households changed fundamentally over time.
Standard errors. I adjust the standard errors for two issues common to wealth data:
heteroskedasticity and missing values. In the presence of heteroskedasticity, the textbook standard error formula for median regression produces estimates that can be substantially smaller than the true standard errors (Rogers, 1992) . In the regressions in this paper, regression residuals are generally larger for high-income households than low-income households.
One obvious way to adjust for heteroskedasticity -bootstrapping -is complicated by the SCF sampling scheme. The SCF samples households on the basis of wealth, and in particular, oversamples wealthy households because they hold both a greater quantity and a greater variety of assets. When a variable, such as net worth, is both the stratification variable and the dependent variable in an analysis, the median regression estimator is not consistent because a crucial identifying assumption -med(ε|x) = 0 -does not hold. 15 I address this selection issue by weighting the median regression with sampling weights that reflect each household's probability of being included in the sample. If these sampling weights represent the underlying population probabilities accurately, the median regression estimator will be consistent.
In addition, the SCF features a stratified, clustered sampling design. Since it is not a random sample, it is not appropriate to use a simple bootstrapping scheme in which each observation has a 1/n probability of selection, where n is the sample size. In anticipation of this difficulty, the SCF includes a file of 1,000 bootstrap samples drawn in accordance with the SCF stratified sampling scheme. The SCF calculates a distinct vector of weights for each bootstrap sample, using the algorithm that creates the weights for the main data set. I use these samples and the accompanying weights to calculate bootstrapped standard errors.
The SCF also provides methods for incorporating the uncertainty associated with missing values into the standard errors. Missing values are particularly a problem with wealth data:
households may be reluctant to reveal their holdings of certain assets, or the assets may be hard to value. For example, 27 percent of households in the 1995 SCF with business assets reported that they did not know their value (Montalto and Sung, 1996) .
In the SCF, missing data are imputed five times by drawing from the estimated conditional distribution of the variable. This technique, called repeated-imputation inference (RII), has several advantages over other methods of handling missing values. RII limits nonresponse bias by incorporating known reasons for nonresponse into the imputation procedure. Since RII includes all available information, it produces more efficient estimates than other methods. RII also explicitly incorporates the imputation uncertainty. 16 Most previous 401(k) research has used the SIPP, which imputes missing data with a hot deck method. An expert panel convened by the Committee on National Statistics criticized the SIPP imputation procedure, noting that "the current crosssectional imputation system for SIPP is very inflexible and is known to be less than optimal in some respects" and does "not adequately reproduce known relationships between income, assets and program participation." 1718 15 Holt et al. (1980) and Nathan and Holt (1980) make this argument in more detail for ordinary least squares. 16 See Little (1992), Montalto and Sung (1996) and Kennickell (1998) Appendix B provides more detail and the formulas used to estimate standard errors. wealth.
RESULTS
Eligible households also had $9,172 more in net worth than ineligible households in 1989, but their net worth grew by a statistically insignificant $4,912 more over the 1989-1998 period, suggesting that some of the growth in financial assets was offset by reductions in real assets. The negative, albeit insignificant, coefficients on changes in net worth excluding 401(k)s, changes in real assets, and changes in home equity are consistent with substitution between 401(k) wealth and real assets. Eligible households also have more expensive homes and more mortgage debt than ineligible households. The overall pattern of coefficients in this specification suggests that 401(k)s increase saving, perhaps partially at the expense of investment in real assets. However, the insignificant change-in-net-worth coefficient could also indicate that 401(k)s have no effect on saving.
Saving taste variables. Adding controls for subjective differences in saving taste, as shown in the right half of Table 4 , weakens the relationship between 401(k) eligibility and saving.
When saving taste variables are added to the specification, the increase in eligible net financial assets relative to ineligible net financial assets over the 1989-1998 time period falls from $11,271
to $7,837 and is no longer significant. For three other measures -net financial assets excluding 401(k)s, net worth, and net worth excluding 401(k)s -the change in eligible wealth relative to the change in ineligible wealth also decreases substantially. The coefficients suggest, for example, that net worth excluding 401(k) wealth decreased by $6,363 more for eligible than ineligible households over the 1989-1998 period. This decrease is almost equivalent in magnitude to the increase in net financial assets.
The specification also suggests that a decrease in home equity may underlie the large, negative coefficient on changes in net worth excluding 401(k) balances. Eligible households accumulated more expensive houses and more mortgage debt over the 1989-1998 period than did ineligible households; the increase in mortgage debt is statistically significant for all three time periods. Correspondingly, home equity fell over the sample period, with a statistically significant decline of $3,510 over the entire 1989-1998 period.
As mentioned previously, the saving taste variables may capture an effect of the 401(k)
program as well as exogeneous differences between eligible and ineligible households. To gauge the sensitivity of the results to the different measures of saving taste, I exclude each measure in turn from the saving taste specification. Excluding the "reason for saving" variables (which include "retirement" as a response) and the "tolerance for risk" variables has the largest effect on the 1989-1998 eligibility interaction coefficient, increasing it from $7,837 to $9,826 and $8,396, respectively. Excluding the other measures increases the coefficient by smaller amounts. As a point of comparison, recall that the coefficient is $11,271 when all saving taste measures are excluded. These results suggest that the relationship between 401(k) eligibility and saving taste is not determined solely by any measure, although measures with a closer association to retirement saving appear to play a larger role.
The full set of coefficients from the Table 4 net financial assets specification, including the subjective saving taste measures, are presented in Appendix C. The coefficients follow sensible patterns: for example, wealth increases with income, education, age and the time horizon for saving. The coefficients are consistent across specifications; the full set of coefficients from other specifications are available upon request.
The inverse hyperbolic sine transformation. Although Table 4 suggests that 401(k) eligibility increases wealth, there is an alternative way to view these numbers. As indicated by the sample statistics in Table 3 , eligible and ineligible households differ dramatically in their wealth holdings. In 1998, for example, the median net financial assets of eligible households were $26,472, contrasted with a median of $1,940 for ineligible households. Eligible households may have more wealth than ineligible households at a point in time because the specification does not control completely for underlying differences between the two groups. Examining the change in wealth within the group of eligible households, relative to the change for ineligible households, may control better for this unobserved heterogeneity.
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However, when eligible households have more wealth than ineligible households, comparisons of changes within groups can also be misleading. If the wealth of the two groups grows at the same rate, but eligible households begin with more wealth, the wealth of eligible households will increase in arithmetic terms relative to ineligible households. 20 The traditional solution to this problem -a percentage change specification implemented by taking the natural logarithm of the dependent variable -is inappropriate because wealth measures often take on negative values. 21 Twenty one percent of my sample, for example, has negative net financial
assets.
An alternative transformation, the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS), approximates the natural logarithm but is defined for positive and negative values of wealth. If θ is a scaling parameter and
x is a measure of wealth, the IHS is θ is large relative to θ, this derivative approximates the derivative of the log; if x is small relative to θ, the derivative is approximately one. Linearity may be a more appealing assumption for small values of wealth: we may not want to treat a household whose wealth increases from $1 to $2 equivalently to a household whose wealth increases from $10,000 to $20,000.
19 Engen and Gale (2000) emphasize the over-time coefficient, rather than the "eligibility" coefficient, for these reasons. They also find large and positive coefficients on eligibility. 20 This change-over-time in levels specification is common in the literature; see, for example, Engen and Gale (1997) and Sabelhaus and Ayotte (1998) . Engen and Gale (2000) discuss the shortcomings of this specification. 21 Engen and Gale (2000) , using a technique outlined in Johnson, Kitamura and Neal (2000) , apply the natural logarithm transformation after setting negative wealth values to 1. If the conditional median is greater than zero, this recoding does not affect the coefficients. However, standard errors are affected in some cases. The technique changes the distribution of the residuals, and the analytical standard error formula depends on the distribution of the residuals at zero. 22 If x is large, ln(θx + √ (θ 2 x 2 + 1)) ≈ ln2θ + lnx, which is simply a vertical displacement of the logarithm.
If ε has a LaPlace, or double exponential, distribution, my estimators β and θ can be interpreted as maximum likelihood estimators. I estimate the optimal value of θ for each wealth measure by maximum likelihood, thus extending the work of Burbidge, Magee and Robb (1989) to the case of median regression. 23 The IHS transformation includes the "levels" specification as a special case: as θ → zero, IHS(x) → x. 24 For all wealth measures, a likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the optimal θ equals zero, suggesting that the IHS specification is preferable to the levels specification. Table 5 shows the effect of applying the IHS transformation to the wealth measure.
Coefficients are displayed as marginal effects evaluated at the median level of the wealth measure in the sample. As in the levels specification, eligible households have significantly more financial assets in 1989 than ineligible households. However, contrary to the levels specification, their financial assets do not increase much over time relative to the growth of ineligible assets. In the saving taste specification, the 1989-1998 "over time" coefficient is only $1,451 using the net financial assets measure, compared to $7,837 in the comparable levels specification. This divergence suggests that the higher levels of net financial assets held by eligible households at the beginning of the period, were, in fact, inflating the over-time coefficients.
For the other wealth measures, the IHS specification, like the levels specification, suggests that 401(k) balances do not represent new saving. For example, in the saving taste IHS specification, net worth excluding 401(k)s decreased by $6,183 for eligible households relative to ineligible households over the 1989-1998 time period. This point estimate is almost identical to 23 The optimal values of θ, assuming ε has a LaPlace distribution, are 0.001 for net financial assets, net financial assets excluding 401(k)s, and home equity; 0.0007 for net real assets; 0.0003 for net financial assets plus pension wealth; and 0.0001 for net worth, net worth excluding 401(k)s, and net worth including pension wealth. Under the assumption that ε has a normal distribution, Burbidge, Magee and Robb find an optimal θ value of 0.0001 for net worth. Kennickell and Sunden (1997) An IHS specification incorporates more heterogeneity than a levels specification, since the marginal effect of eligibility depends on the level of wealth. Following Engen and Gale, I also allow the marginal effect of eligibility over time to depend on income. Table 7 shows changes in wealth for eligible households relative to ineligible households within income groups over the 1995-1998 time period. The specification uses the saving taste variables, the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, and the 1995-1998 definition of eligibility, thus adjusting for three possible sources of bias. The IHS transformation is evaluated at the median level of each wealth measure within each income group. Since these results are based on smaller samples, they are noisier than the previous results.
The difference in wealth between eligible and ineligible households clearly increases with income. Using the IHS results, in 1995 eligible households with income between $10,000 and $30,000 had $1,176 more net financial assets than equivalent ineligible households. Eligible households with income between $50,000 and $80,000 had $18,611 more net financial assets than ineligible households. 25 Using propensity score methods, Benjamin (2001) also finds heterogeneous effects across households.
As with earlier results, however, almost no wealth measure increased for any income group over the 1995-1998 period. For example, net financial assets grew by only $1,910 more for eligible than ineligible households in the $50,000-$80,000 income group. This near-zero growth is especially surprising given that median 401(k) balances in this income group grew by nearly $10,000, in real dollars, over the 1995-1998 time period. 27 Net financial assets excluding 401(k) wealth decreased for all groups, and measures of net worth and home equity fell for all groups but eligible households in the $30,000-$50,000 income category. The mortgage debt specification differs somewhat from the earlier findings: although eligible households have substantially more mortgage debt than ineligible households in all income categories in 1995, their mortgage debt did not grow over the 1995-1998 period. For one income class and specification, mortgage debt declines by a statistically significant amount. In general, these results contrast with Engen and Gale's conclusion that 401(k) eligibility may raise the wealth of households with low earnings. (2000) for a good discussion of these trends.
Standard errors.
The conversion of non-401(k) defined contribution plans to 401(k) plans has been welldocumented. 31 Whether firms explicitly convert defined benefit pensions to 401(k)s is less clear: Papke (1999) found that over the 1985-1992 period, one defined benefit plan was terminated for every three 401(k) plans that were created, but Ippolito and Thompson (2000) suggest that some of these terminated plans were actually subsumed into another plan through a corporate merger or other reorganization. 32 Alternatively, firms may substitute between defined benefit and 401(k)
plans by redirecting resources to a 401(k) plan while retaining the defined benefit plan. This measure is likely to be imprecise, for at least two reasons. First, any calculation of pension wealth relies on a series of arbitrary assumptions; the assumptions used in this paper are described in detail in Appendix A. Second, self-reported pension information is notoriously noisy. Researchers have used three data sets that include both employee-reported and employerreported data on pension coverage -the 1983 SCF (Mitchell,1988, and Gustman and Steinmeier, 1989) , the 1989 SCF (Starr-McCluer and Sunden, 1999) , and the 1992 HRS (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000) -and have concluded that workers are not well-informed about many aspects of 31 See Andrews (1992), Engen, Gale and Scholz (1996) and Gale, Papke and VanDerhei (2000) . 32 Papke, Peterson and Poterba (1996) is consistent with both views: out of a sample of 43 pension plan sponsors, 45 percent indicated that another pension plan was converted into a 401(k) between 1986 and 1990. However, only one of these plans was a defined-benefit plan.
their pension coverage. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000), for example, find that only about half of all respondents can correctly identify whether their retirement plan is a defined benefit or defined contribution pension. In addition, although the means and medians of the distributions of employer-and employee-reported pension values match well, only about 40 percent of the pension values reported by employees agree, even roughly, with the corresponding values reported by their employer. Table 9 examines the effect of adding pension wealth to the Table 7 specification.
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Including pension assets affects the eligibility and the eligibility*year=98 coefficients very differently. The eligibility coefficient, which measures the difference in wealth between eligible and ineligible households at a point in time, increases for every income group when pension assets are added to the net financial assets measure. For middle-income households, for example, the coefficient increases from $10,173 to $20,132.
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However, the eligibility*year=98 coefficient, which measures the change in wealth for eligible households relative to the change in wealth for ineligible households, barely changes for any income group. Using the same example, for middle-income households the coefficient increases from $-308 to $765.
The stark discrepancy in the behavior of the two coefficients underscores the differences between eligible and ineligible households. Eligible households tend to have more wealth in all forms than ineligible households, including in non-401(k) pension benefits. Looking at changes within the group of eligible households may control better for this unobserved heterogeneity.
33 See Gale, Papke and VanDerhei (2000) for anecdotal evidence of this form of substitution. 34 The net financial assets results are not identical to the results in Table 7 because I exclude a dummy for defined benefit plan participation from the right hand side. 35 401(k) eligible households are more likely than ineligible households to have defined benefit pension coverage, partially explaining the increase in the eligibility coefficient. In 1995, SCF tabulations suggest that 30 percent of 401(k) eligible households and 23 percent of ineligible households participated in a defined benefit pension.
Using the Health and Retirement Survey and a self-reported definition of 401(k) eligibility, Engelhardt (2000) found that the difference in wealth between eligible and ineligible households in 1992 decreased substantially when he included pension assets in the wealth measure. When I repeat the Table 9 specification using the 1989-1992 definition of eligibility, the eligibility coefficient in the "net financial and pension assets" specification falls substantially, from $20,132
to $6,199 in the middle income group and from $32,959 to $-10,187 in the high income group.
CONCLUSION
Although the 401(k) balances of eligible households grew dramatically over the 1989-1998 time period, the wealth of eligible households, relative to ineligible households, did not.
This finding reflects several refinements in this paper relative to previous work. I control for differences in subjective measures of saving taste; use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation, evaluated at the optimal parameters, to assess changes in wealth over time; and modify the inference for heteroskedasticity and imputation uncertainty. In addition, the analysis is based on the most recent and highest quality wealth data available.
Benjamin (2000) and Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994) also find higher DB coverage rates for 401(k) eligible households using the SIPP. 36 The HRS contains employer-provided pension information for approximately half of Engelhardt's sample. Engelhardt includes results that use this subsample and the firm-reported definition of 401(k) eligibility. When pension wealth is added to the net financial assets measure for this sample, the eligible-ineligible difference increases for three income groups and decreases for three groups.
After implementing these improvements, the growth in eligible wealth is essentially equal to the growth in ineligible wealth for all wealth measures. This finding holds true even within income groups, contrasting with the conclusion of Engen and Gale (2000) that 401(k) eligibility may raise the wealth of low-income groups. Adding pension assets to the wealth measure increases the difference between eligible and ineligible wealth at a point in time, but again does not increase the wealth of eligible households, relative to ineligible households, over time.
Instead, eligible households appear to be funding their 401(k) accounts by decreasing their investments in real assets, especially home equity.
The conclusions of this paper depend, in part, on the assumption that the subjective saving taste measures are only capturing exogeneous differences in saving taste. However, 401(k) eligibility may increase a worker's interest in saving for retirement. If the saving taste measures also reflect this effect, the results suggest that aspects of the program such as its educational component or the signal sent by employer provision of retirement benefits are important.
Although eligible households clearly benefited from the tax subsidies in the 401(k)
program, the program does not appear to have stimulated their saving. The program may, however, decrease national saving: in 1997 alone, the government did not collect taxes on $116 billion in 401(k) contributions. 37 These findings suggest that the government is getting a small benefit from a large tax expenditure.
APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCTION OF 401(K) ELIGIBILITY AND PENSION WEALTH VARIABLES
401(K) eligibility. The SCF does not ask households directly if they are eligible for a 401(k). Instead, this information has to be inferred from other questions on the survey. Furthermore, the questions are different in 1989 and 1992 than in 1995 and 1998. This complex question structure is depicted in the accompanying flowchart. The striped boxes are questions asked only in 1995 and 1998. The two rows of boxes at the bottom of the chart show, by year, the eligibility classifications for four mutually-exclusive categories of workers. These categories are dictated by the SCF survey questions. Since two spouses may be in different categories, the sample sizes in the boxes do not sum to the total number of households.
A white box denotes an accurate classification: every worker in a white box marked "eligible" should, in fact, be 401(k) eligible. If a box is grey, the classification is not completely accurate. Some workers in a grey box marked "eligible" are 401(k) eligible, but others are not. As further evidence that the measurement problem is not severe, Appendix Table A1 compares selected demographic and saving taste characteristics of eligible and ineligible households under the two definitions. Under the 1995-1998 definition, ineligible households are slightly younger, poorer, less educated and less wealthy than households deemed ineligible under the 1989-1992 definition. In general these differences are small, although differences in median wealth are somewhat larger. In 1998, for example, median net financial assets for ineligible households were $1,940 under the 1989-1992 definition and $1,218 under the 1995-1998 definition. The samples also differ substantially in the percentage covered by a defined-benefit pension because the 1995-1998 "eligible" definition, unlike the 1989-1992 definition, includes households that have a defined benefit pension but do not participate in a 401(k).
Pension wealth. Since pension wealth is the present value of a future benefit, any calculation involves a number of arbitrary assumptions. For defined contribution plans, which include 401(k)s as well as other account-style plans, I set the pension value equal to the current account balance. Most studies use this assumption, 38 although a few include the present value of expected future employee and employer contributions to the plan.
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For defined benefit plans, SCF respondents can state the expected benefit either as a fixed amount that they expect to receive each period (e.g., $400 a month) or as a percentage of salary.
If the respondent gives a fixed amount, I assume that the benefit is stated in the dollars of the expected year of retirement. 40 If the respondent gives a percentage of salary, I assume that the respondent's real wages grow one percent annually until the expected retirement date.
I assume a discount rate of 6.3 percent and a future inflation rate of 4 percent. These assumptions, and the assumption of one percent real wage growth, are taken from the Social Security Administration's intermediate projections (Board of Trustees, 1995) . 41 Mortality probabilities are conditioned on age, gender and race and are taken from the appropriate year of 38 See, e.g., Kennickell and Sunden (1997) for a study using the SCF, and Gustman and Steinmeier (2000) for a study using the HRS. 39 See, e.g., Khitatrakun, Kitamura and Scholz (2000) . 40 Kennickell and Sunden (1997) also make this assumption. 41 Peticolas and Steinmeier (1999) use these values as their baseline scenario when calculating the present values of pension wealth from employer-provided pension documentation. 1995 1998 1989-1992 definition 1995-1998 definition 1989-1992 definition 1995-1998 
APPENDIX B: CALCULATING MEDIAN REGRESSION STANDARD ERRORS USING THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES
In this paper, four data-related factors complicate estimation of the median regression point estimates and standard errors. The first two of these factors, as listed below, affect all SCF analyses; the other two are specific to this paper. To recap these four issues:
(1) Missing values. Households either do not know the answer to some questions, or refuse to answer these questions.
(2) Survey data issues. The SCF is not a random sample. The sample design includes clustering and stratification, both of which can affect standard errors. To protect respondents' identities, the SCF does not release these stratification and clustering variables. Therefore, I cannot use the textbook methods to adjust the standard errors for these sample design features.
(3) Heteroskedasticity. I regress wealth on income. In a levels of wealth specification, residuals for high-income households are larger than residuals for low-income households. In this situation, the textbook standard error formula for median regression produces estimates that can be substantially smaller than the true standard errors (Rogers 1992) .
(4) Selection issues. The SCF is stratified on the dependent variable, net worth. Without dealing with this selection problem, the median regression estimator is not consistent.
I address these four problems as follows:
(1) The SCF data set contains five complete replicates of each observation. Missing data are imputed five times by drawing from the estimated conditional distribution of the variable; each of these estimates is contained in a different replicate. This technique is called repeated-imputation inference. It is discussed on the SCF web site: http://www.bog.frb.fed.us/pubs/oss/oss2/scfindex.html.
(2) In a separate file, the SCF provides 1,000 bootstrap samples for the first of the five replicates. These bootstrap samples are drawn in accordance with the SCF sampling design. Individual weights are calculated for each bootstrap sample using the SCF weighting algorithm. These bootstrap files are available for the 1989, 1992 and 1995 SCFs from their web site. By bootstrapping the standard errors, I incorporate the clustering and stratification features of the sample.
(3) As in (2), I adjust for the heteroskedasticity by bootstrapping the standard errors.
The SCF provides sample weights that reflect each household's probability of being included in the sample. I weight the median regression with these weights.
In repeated-imputation inference, the formulas for the coefficients and the standard errors are: Note on STATA's "qreg" command: STATA's qreg command may still provide misleading inference even when the four problems discussed here are not an issue. Qreg estimates the regression standard errors using the textbook analytical standard error formula, which includes an estimate of the density of the residuals at zero. STATA computes this density in a manner similar to the nearestneighbor method. However, STATA's estimator includes the term (√n)-k in the denominator. As a result, whenever √n is close to k, the estimates of the variance are near-zero. $89,565 $34,802 $66,152 $27,655 $68,729 $31,332 $76,385 $26,868 Net financial assets 
